Volume 2,Issue 3
Minimum Viable Decentralisation for Blockchain-Enabled Philanthropy: A Governance Framework for Verifiable Accountability under Intensive Regulatory Oversight
This article develops Minimum Viable Decentralisation (MVD) for blockchain-enabled philanthropy under intensive regulatory oversight. MVD shifts attention from node counts to verification rights: statutory authority and organisational liability may remain centralised, but one effective controller should not dominate key evidence, claim validation, material rule changes, and external review. Five non-compensatory conditions are specified: source independence, independent validation authority, constrained material rule changes, portable external review, and accountable intervention with remedies. A closure test, removal-to-failure test, and risk tiering operationalise the framework. MVD does not measure social impact; it asks whether material operational claims are independently reviewable. Blockchain is warranted only where it adds verifiable accountability beyond credible databases and independent audit.
[1] Dethier F, Delcourt C, Dessart L, 2024, Donor Perceptions of Nonprofit Organizations' Transparency: Conceptualization and Operationalization. Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly, 53(5): 1230–1260.
[2] Zhang Y, 2026, Managed Transparency as Platform-Era Decoupling in Internet Philanthropy: Evidence from China. Business & Society, 0: 0.
[3] Kuruppu S, Dissanayake D, de Villiers C, 2022, How Can NGO Accountability Practices Be Improved With Technologies Such as Blockchain and Triple-Entry Accounting? Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal, 35(7): 1714–1742.
[4] Roy GM, Ali SA, Aakash, Sharma C, Kumar A, Vijay R, 2026, ClearGive: A Governance-Driven Blockchain Framework for Enhancing Transparency, Auditability, and Regulatory Compliance in Digital Philanthropy. EDPACS, 1–10.
[5] Beck R, Müller-Bloch C, King JL, 2018, Governance in the Blockchain Economy: A Framework and Research Agenda. Journal of the Association for Information Systems, 19(10): 1020–1034.
[6] Sai AR, Buckley J, Fitzgerald B, Le Gear A, 2021, Taxonomy of Centralization in Public Blockchain Systems: A Systematic Literature Review. Information Processing & Management, 58(4): 102584.
[7] Axelsen H, Jensen JR, Ross O, 2022, When Is a DAO Decentralized? Complex Systems Informatics and Modeling Quarterly, 31: 51–75.
[8] Caldarelli G, 2020, Understanding the Blockchain Oracle Problem: A Call for Action. Information, 11(11): 509.
[9] Shillito MR, 2026, Decentralised Governance and the Fiduciary Architecture of Charity Law: The Limits of DAO Integration. Information & Communications Technology Law, 1–24.
[10] Wüst K, Gervais A, 2018, Do You Need a Blockchain? 2018 Crypto Valley Conference on Blockchain Technology, 45–54.
[11] Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2023, Charity Law of the People's Republic of China (2023 Amendment).
[12] Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, Cyberspace Administration of China, 2026, Measures for the Administration of Internet Public Fundraising Service Platforms, visited on March 22, 2026, http://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/gongbao/2026/issue_12866/202607/content_7075898.html
[13] Standing Committee of the National People's Congress, 2021, Personal Information Protection Law of the People's Republic of China.
