ARTICLE
16 November 2026

Market Response to ICVCM Methodology Decisions in the Voluntary Carbon Market

Yiming Zhang1
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1 School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington, DC, United States
PBES 2026 , 9(10), 18–33; https://doi.org/10.26689/PBES.v9i10.16184
© 2026 by the Author(s). Licensee: Bio-Byword Scientific Publishing Pty Ltd, Australia. This article is an open access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License ( https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ )
Abstract

The Integrity Council for the Voluntary Carbon Market was created to identify carbon credits that meet a common threshold for integrity, but a governance determination matters economically only if buyers alter their behavior in response. This article tests whether the Integrity Council’s 2024 methodology decisions changed revealed demand, measured by project-level credit retirements. It combines the Integrity Council’s dated decisions with the Berkeley Voluntary Registry Offsets Database, which covers 11,468 projects across six registries and reports annual issuance and retirement histories. The principal analysis examines 1,448 renewable-energy projects and 9,833 project-years from 2018 through 2025. Projects using one of eight methodologies that the Integrity Council rejected in August 2024 are compared with other renewable-energy projects in the same overlapping project types. Models include project fixed effects, project-type-by-year effects, registry-by-year effects, available credit supply, and methodology-clustered standard errors. Contrary to the predicted demand penalty, rejected methodologies show no detectable decline in 2025 retirement intensity or in the probability of recording a retirement. The preferred estimates are 0.019 (standard error 0.288) for inverse-hyperbolic-sine retirements and 0.048 (standard error 0.041) for the retirement probability. Both estimates are imprecise but inconsistent with an immediate, clearly visible negative market response. Results remain similar in a balanced panel, a single-methodology sample, a shorter event window, and specifications without the supply control. A separate comparison of approved ozone-depleting-substance methodologies is too small and has nonparallel pre-trends, so it is reported descriptively rather than interpreted causally. The findings do not show that integrity labels lack value. They show that external governance judgments did not automatically translate into near-term retirement reallocation. This result provides a first large-sample test of buyer demand as a governance condition and identifies the public data needed to evaluate integrity reforms more conclusively.

Keywords
Voluntary carbon market
Carbon credits
ICVCM
Certification
Credit retirements
Private governance
Market integrity
References

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